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Abstract 
Copyright law has always sought to maximize the 
quantity of valuable creative works available to society. 
While protecting the creative artists is essential, it is in 
some sense incidental; the reason to protect the artist is 
that without them, there would be nothing to copy. As 
new digital technologies for transforming artistic works 
gain in capability, the ease of producing innovative and 
valuable works based on the reuse of prior work in-
creases, meaning that society can now benefit from an 
increased supply of works based on the reuse of others. 
This suggests that restrictions on reuse that were con-
sidered optimal in the past should now be relaxed. We 
suggest changes to copyright law to achieve this new 
optimum. We suggest that artistic merit should once 
again be considered relevant to copyright law, in this 
case to determine when artistic works should be permit-
ted to reuse works still subject to copyright protection. 
We retain the concept of originality in deciding when 
works based on reuse should themselves be granted 
copyright. 
1. Introduction 
1.1. The Complex Aims of Copyright Law 
From its inception, copyright law has always had com-
plex aims because it has always sought to find an opti-
mal balance between two conflicting objectives. Copy-
right law, like patent law and all other forms of intellec-
tual property rights regulations, seeks to benefit society 
by simultaneously maximizing society’s supply of in-
novation by protecting creators and to maximize soci-
ety’s access to innovation by limiting the protection af-
forded to creators [1]. Copyright law seeks to protect the 
innovators who create new works of art and new practi-
cal inventions, because without innovative originals 
there would be nothing to copy. Protecting the creative 
innovator is usually done by providing incentives for 
creativity, and this usually involves awarding the crea-
tor with a limited period in which the creator has sole 
control over how the innovation is to be used. This bal-
ance between protecting creation and protecting access 
has been debated everywhere that intellectual property 
rights are protected, and its importance was so clear that 
patent law is actually included in the U.S. constitution 
[2]. During this period of monopoly rights to the work, 
the innovators can make as many copies as they wish, 
or can license the innovation to one or more other par-
ties, and can grant them well-defined and well-delim-
ited rights to reproduce the innovation as well. Provid-
ing access to society usually involves placing clear lim-
its on the duration of the innovator’s monopoly rights, 
and when this limited period of monopoly rights ends 
others can begin to produce more copies, perhaps with 
enhancements, and this results in increased competition, 
which in turn results in lower prices and more choice 
for consumers. 
It should be self-evident that as it becomes easier to 
copy, transform, and extend an original, society will 
gain more by relaxing the restrictions on copying. While 
this does not tell us how much to relax copyright pro-
tection, it makes it clear that the new balance between 
protecting the original creator’s rights and protecting 
society’s access will certainly shift in the direction of 
encouraging more access. Prior work by Jerald Hughes 
et al. makes this same point in the context of the open-
source culture that has emerged where artists base their 
work in large part on existing work, and expect their 
own work likewise to be used and reused by others [1].  
In a very real sense, the definitive art form of the 
21st century may be the mashup or collage [3], because 
of advances in digital technologies that enable reuse, 
transformation, and redistribution [4]. This is based in 
part on the fluidity and mutability of digital representa-
tions and on the power and ease of use of digital tech-
nologies; for example, in music the elaborate multi-
track recording and mixing studios that provided the 
unique power of commercial record labels can now be 
replicated in the garage of any home enthusiast [3] di-
minishing the power of these labels [5]. This democra-
tization of creativity requires rethinking of copyright 
law; if anyone can create value by reusing existing ar-
tistic works, then restricting this reuse of prior works 
should be easier than it is today. If reuse of existing art 
now leads to the increased creation of valuable new art, 
then restrictions on reuse are demonstrably more costly 
to society than they were in the past. 
Art has always drawn on the works of prior artists 
including the motifs, arrangements, characters, themes, 
techniques, storylines, perspectives, and more [6, 7]. 
The spectacular Roman statue The Boxer is believed to 
be a copy by a talented Roman sculptor of a brilliant 
work by a Greek sculptor before him. Bach and Vivaldi 
borrowed themes freely from their earlier compositions 






and almost as freely from each other. The musicals Kiss 
Me Kate, Two Gentlemen of Verona, and The Boys 
from Syracuse [8] are all based on works of Shake-
speare. Similarly, Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet pro-
vided the inspiration for Bernstein’s West Side Story. In 
all these cases, the copies were produced by enormously 
talented sculptors, composers, and playwrights. Modern 
forms of copying and reuse are far easier, which com-
plicates regulatory regimes. Value-adding copying is 
more prevalent, which allows it to add more value for 
society; however, because it is more prevalent, the po-
tential loss to the creators of prior art is also greater. 
More specifically, we will address the range of ac-
tivities that are now possible and indeed can now be ex-
ploited by a second artist to add value to the works of 
the first. We will explore the value that these activities 
can create for viewers, readers, and audiences broadly 
construed. And we will explore changes to copyright 
law and licensing agreements to develop novel, fair, and 
equitable ways of combining the value thus created by 
these activities. 
By the turn of the twentieth century, a principle of 
aesthetic neutrality in the evaluation of copyrightability 
developed across different copyright jurisdictions. In 
France La loi du 11 mars 1902 defined the principle that 
protection of work should depend neither on the merit 
nor the purpose of it (‘la protection d'une œuvre ne dé-
pend ni de son mérite ni de sa destination’). In the UK, 
the skill and labor doctrine came to prescribe that works 
protectable under copyright law irrespective of their ar-
tistic merits; skill, labor, and judgment are enough to 
make a work original [cf. 9]. The US Supreme Court’s 
decision in 1903 [10] defined a similar principle that 
copyright protection of a work does not depend on ar-
tistic merits, as famously declared by Justice Holmes ‘It 
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained 
only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the nar-
rowest and most obvious limits.’ 
The general principle of aesthetic neutrality in cop-
yright law has gradually taken hold as a defining world 
view for assessing whether or not a work deserves to be 
protected; the originality – in the sense of originating 
from a creator – of its contribution remains central, 
while the intrinsic value of its contribution remains in 
principle undiscussable. Yet, commentators have 
pointed out that aesthetic neutrality in courts is hard to 
sustain [11-14]. 
In our recommendations for policy, we would like 
to challenge the principle of aesthetic neutrality in as-
sessments of copyrightability making the case that the 
principle is not only unfeasible but also undesirable 
given developments in digital technology. Digital tech-
nologies facilitate the democratization of art by ena-
bling almost anyone with just a tad of artistic vision they 
wish to create or with an artistic statement they wish to 
make to complete their creation [3, 4]. Technologies for 
combining, altering, or extending digital works are easy 
to master (Ibid.). Since this democratization is inevita-
ble and socially beneficial, we believe that it should be 
permitted when it adds value, which means merit must 
be considered. Moreover, we believe that when works 
involving the reuse of protected materials both add 
value and themselves pass a threshold for artistic con-
tribution, they too should be granted copyright protec-
tion in their own right. We explore these two concepts 
in more detail in section 5, which addresses our recom-
mendations for policy on the regulation of works in-
volving the reuse of material protected by copyright. 
However, when these works involving reuse are used 
commercially and produce revenue themselves, the 
question of revenue division between the original artist 
and the reusing artist is too complex for us to resolve at 
this time. 
We briefly recapitulate our research agenda here: 
• We will classify the forms of transformations and 
of artistic reuse enabled by new technologies. This 
will establish why we believe technology-enabled 
transformational forms of reuse are sufficient to re-
quire reexamination of copyright law and reconsid-
eration of the role of artistic merit as a factor in de-
cisions regarding reuse of materials protected by 
copyright. 
• We will also classify these transformations based 
on their economic value to society and based on 
their economic impact on the original creator of the 
work being reused. 
• Finally, we will provide recommendations on when 
reuse should be permitted and how it should be reg-
ulated. 
2. Background on Copyright Law 
2.1. The Origins of Copyright Law 
Early copyright law — the 1710 Statute of Anne in the 
United Kingdom and the French Act of 19-24 July 1793 
— broke the dominance of book guilds [15] and estab-
lished a free market for ideas [16]. Roughly speaking, 
in the early days, literary copyright provided a simple 
protection against 1:1 substitutions of printed volumes 
[17] while artistic copyright outlawed unauthorized en-
gravings and casts [18]. As such copyright law pro-
tected authors' and publishers’ investments in literary 
and artistic works. Furthermore, a rationale for copy-
right put forward at the time of the early debates on cop-
yright, most notably by Daniel Defoe, was that it offered 
a protection against copying that would destroy the 
value of originals. Defoe made the case that press piracy 
amounted to either the unauthorized printing of abridg-
ments of published books or the re-printing of books in 
poor quality, including on cheap paper and in small 
print. This, Defoe, pointed out, was socially harmful 
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since the public would be deceived into thinking that the 
abridgments and the low-quality reprints contained the 
substance of the original book [19]. Besides, it was 
harmful to the author who as an effect of piracy would 
not be valued on the basis of what he had said in the 
original book [20].  
2.2. Debates over the Proper Balance in  Copy-
right Law 
Since the beginning of copyright, a Lockensian labor 
theory of intangible property has often been applied to 
justify the exclusive right to copying [21]. This owner-
ship of literary and artistic works can be claimed by ref-
erence to the labor put into creating the work. Balancing 
any interest in individual ownership with the general in-
terest of preserving a commons is secured by ensuring 
that the commons is not significantly devalued by the 
appropriation of ideas and turning them into copy-
righted material and by observing the Lockean non-
waste condition [22]. In a similar vein the cultural argu-
ment for copyright point to three groups of stakeholders 
including authors whose interest it is to maintain an in-
come from their works and getting acknowledgment for 
it while also securing the work’s integrity Publishers 
aim to profit from publishing editions. The public’s in-
terest is two-fold and consists of individual interests in 
making use of copyrighted works on reasonable terms. 
The collective interest is in all persons having a reason-
able right of use for the sake of the general development 
and dissemination of knowledge [23]. Importantly the 
limited term of copyright along with a number of excep-
tions to the exclusive right has been considered the 
means to ensure balance between stakeholders and that 
the non-waste criterion is upheld [24]. 
3. Literature Review 2 — The Early Role 
of Technology in the Performing Arts 
New art forms, and new ways of reproducing and trans-
mitting art forms dramatically transformed the perform-
ing arts in the 20th and 21st centuries. Sound recordings, 
even in a pre-digital era, introduced new considerations 
[25]. These issues became even more significant with 
the advent of radio and royalties for playing a recording. 
The recording artist paid the author, and that was pretty 
straightforward. But each recording became a unique 
instantiation, and each play on air became a unique pay-
ment opportunity. ASCAP (American Society of Com-
posers, Authors and Publishers) and RIAA (Recording 
Industry Association of America) emerged to track on-
air usage and to ensure that artists were compensated 
appropriately. 
VCRs introduced the ability to record at home, in-
cluding the ability to record from broadcast sources, 
creating new opportunities for producing unauthorized 
copies of protected performances. There was much 
debate about how this should be handled, and in 1992 
the Audio Home Recording Act was introduced. Royal-
ties for blank digital media and recording devices were 
introduced, and safeguards to prevent second-genera-
tion or serial copies were implemented (SCMS, Serial 
Copy Management System) [26]. 
With the widespread adoption of home DVD play-
ers, the production side of the movie industry became 
concerned that movie attendance would suffer. Video 
rentals, both VCR cassettes and DVDs and video sales 
created the concern that the sale of videos for home use 
would also suffer, since a single copy owned commer-
cially could be shared with a large number of users, re-
ducing their need both to view in theater and to purchase 
for home viewing. Online streaming made these con-
cerns even more acute. Rental stores paid a higher price 
for movies and Blockbuster pioneered a revenue-shar-
ing system with Studios) to incorporate royalties for 
renting [27]. 
The continuous improvement of digital editing 
tools for sound recordings made mashups increasingly 
popular [28]. What had been a laborious artform in the 
age of analog music became feasible for anyone with 
access to a computer and a digital editing tool. Mashup 
artist often distributed their work “underground”, leav-
ing no fair revenue for sampled artists [28]. Similarly, 
digital photo and video editing tools made collages a 
more widespread phenomenon. It became easy to access 
digital photos on videos on the Internet and to re-com-
bine them with popular, relatively easy-to-use software 
such as Adobe Photoshop or Adobe Premiere [29, 30].  
Further artforms that emerged due to the advance-
ments of digital technology include user-generated 
work such as playlists and game mods. The playlist—a 
set of songs in a fixed order—is known from radio pro-
grams and mixtapes. But with digital music streaming, 
playlists have become a product that users create not 
only for themselves but to share with any other user [31]. 
This has sparked a discussion of whether playlists are 
themselves works that warrant copyright. Game mods 
are user-generated enhancements and extensions to 
video games. Some forms of enhancements are barely 
tolerated by serious gamers, like the various practices 
related to Goldfarming, which involve earning in-game 
assets or developing advanced gaming characters, and 
selling them to novices [32]. Others are seen to create 
value for games and gamers and are thus more generally 
accepted, and now even embraced and facilitated by 
game developers. Game developers now provide mod-
ding tools to facilitate creating game extensions  
4. Reuse — Transmission, Enhancements, 
Recombination, and Transformation, 
And the Role of Modern Technology 
We are certainly not the first authors to attempt to 
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develop a classification of forms of digital transfor-
mation; see, for example, Table on page 12 in Hughes, 
Lang [1]. Our classification differs in two significant 
ways. First, and most importantly, we no longer make 
the distinction between reuse implemented by the orig-
inal creator and reuse implemented by others. Technol-
ogies for reuse, modification, enhancement, and trans-
mission have become so powerful and so easy in the 
decades since Hughes, Lang [1] was written that we as-
sume that ultimately most changes will be feasible for 
almost anyone to implement. For that reason, we focus 
our analysis solely on the copyright implications of re-
use by parties other than the original creator. Addition-
ally, and less significantly, our classification of forms 
of reuse, modification, and enhancement is informed by 
additional decades of technological development for 
digital reuse, and is therefore more complete. Notably, 
we distinguish (1) simple reproduction or retransmis-
sion, without quality changes, (2) reproduction with 
higher quality, (3) reproduction with enhancements, in-
cluding extensions and multi-user versions of existing 
games (4) recombination and repurposing, (5) digital 
transformation, including reperformance. See Table 1, 
below, for a summary of transformations of artistic and 
other creative works, where the original underlying 
works are protected by existing intellectual property 
rights regimes. 
We provide this classification for two reasons. 
First, it helps demonstrate how profoundly technology 
has enhanced the scope for reuse of protected works, 
which in turn helps motivate our argument that copy-
right law should be reexamined. Additionally, it helps 
guide analysis of which forms of reuse are artistically 
and transformationally trivial and which may have suf-
ficient merit to justify protection. 
4.1. Reuse without Quality Changes 
Simple reproduction or retransmission, without quality 
changes has become a widespread phenomenon for var-
ious types of media because digital technologies have 
made it so easy. Digital photographs can be easily cop-
ied and shared via the Internet and analog photographs 
can easily be digitalized via scanning. In particular, on 
social media platforms such as Pinterest, Instagram, and 
Facebook, digital copies of photographs are shared en 
masse, frequently without permission from the photog-
rapher or copyright holder [33]. In the US, the safe har-
bor regulation from the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act [34] protects the platform operates from being pros-
ecuted for copyright infringement on their platforms. 
Thus, copyright holders have been unsuccessful in su-
ing platform operators when their material has been 
shared on their platforms; instead they have been forced 
to litigate individually against every user who shared 
protected photographs or other protected materials [33]. 
Similar to photographs, digital reproduction of artwork 
such as paintings, lithographs or even sculptures can be 
digitalized vis photographing, 2D-, and 3D-scanning 
[35]. If the original artwork is public domain, such re-
productions are possible. Cultural institutions such as 
museums have tried to establish copyright for their dig-
ital reproductions but have failed to do so; for example 
in the cases National Portrait Gallery (UK) v. Wiki-
media Commons and Bridgeman v. Corel [36].  
Digital technologies have further simplified the 
copying of music and video material. As digital formats 
for music (e.g., MP3) and videos (e.g., MPEG) became 
available, it was easy for users to make digital copies of 
analog material and share this material. This led to a 
wave of peer-to-peer file sharing in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s [37] with Napster being the most prominent 
example. On the Napster platform, music and other pro-
tected material were shared en masse, which had a neg-
ative impact on revenue for artists [38]. However, 
RIAA and A&M Records sued for copyright infringe-
ment and won, leading to settlement payments and a 
shutdown of the Napster file-sharing network [39]. The 
phenomenon of file sharing persisted with new plat-
forms emerging as quickly as existing platforms got 
shut down. With increasing internet speed on-demand 
streaming of music and videos became more and more 
popular, raising new copyright issues. Besides legiti-
mate services such as Spotify for music or Netflix for 
videos, a plethora of illegal websites emerged to offer 
streaming of material they offered without the authori-
zation of the copyright owners. In the US, the practice 
was particularly widespread with Game of Thrones be-
coming the most illegally streamed material ever, due 
to the so-called “streaming loophole”: Streaming was 
not seen as copying [40], thus watching a stream was 
not illegal. Hosting a stream was, but was only prose-
cuted as a misdemeanor. As a result of recent regulatory 
changes, operating a public for-profit streaming service 
without permission to use materials under copyright is 
now a felony [41].  Video platforms such as YouTube, 
where users can upload and share any video material, 
further highlight copyright issues. In its early days, 
YouTube users could upload video material without 
YouTube controlling for any copyright violations. This 
changed due to lawsuits such as Viacom v. YouTube in 
2013. Viacom sued because YouTube users uploaded 
copyrighted content. However, the lawsuit and appeal 
were decided in favor of YouTube because of the safe 
harbor regulation in the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act. In the end, the parties settled: Viacom did not seek 
damages and YouTube developed the “Content ID” to 
identify copyright infringement. With the Content ID, 
copyrighted material is detected and users can decide 
whether to delete the content or to accept ads that would 
be added to the material and that would generate reve-
nue for the copyright owner [42]. A further copyright 
issue emerged as players of video games began 
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uploading recordings of their gameplay and, with in-
creasing Internet speed, began live-streaming their 
gameplay on platforms such as YouTube and Twitch 
[43]. Balancing the interests of game developers as cop-
yright holders, gamers as users, and Internet platforms 
remains an open issue.  
With regard to software, simple reproduction re-
fers to copying a software product. If the product is cop-
yright protected, this is typically referred to as piracy 
[44]. Copyright owners try to protect their products 
through safeguards such as registration codes, which in 
turn, criminals try to circumvent by “cracking” or even 
stealing registration codes [45].  
4.2. Reuse with Higher Quality 
Digital technologies have enabled the reproduction with 
higher quality of artwork. First, musical recordings can 
be remastered, not only transforming analog formats 
into digital formats but increasing the sound quality [46]. 
If the original material is copyright protected, remaster-
ing typically can only be done with the authorization of 
the copyright holder. However, until 2018, material 
from before 1972 was not protected, raising the question 
of whether remastered material would be granted new 
copyright. In an ongoing case [47], a recent opinion 
states that “a derivative sound recording distinctly iden-
tifiable solely by the changes in a medium generally 
does not exhibit the minimum level of originality to be 
copyrightable.” While material from after 1972 has al-
ways been protected from derivative work without au-
thorization, this protection has been extended to pre-
1972 work with a blanket copyright as part of the Music 
Modernization Act from 2018 [48]. 
Reproduction enabled by digital technologies can 
not only increase quality but also enhance the original 
artwork. Such reproduction with enhancements covers 
improving the functionality of software under copyright, 
modding an existing game to improve image quality, 
adapting a play to a new version or to a musical, adapt-
ing a play or a musical to a movie, taking single-user 
versions of software for word processing and spread-
sheets and adapting for multi-user updates. Reproduc-
tion with enhancements raises complex copyright issues 
that are related to questions such as whether the copy-
right of the original work is infringed and whether the 
enhanced work warrants copyright on its own. In the 
software industry, the software has often been copied 
and enhanced, sometimes by imitating user interfaces, 
sometimes by using code from the original software. 
For example, the cases of VisiCalc v. Lotus [49, 50] and 
Lotus v. Microsoft Excel [51] raised the question of 
when copying a user interface becomes copyright in-
fringement, even if the functionality of the software has 
been enhanced. In these complex lawsuits, decisions de-
pended on how much of the look-and-feel was actually 
copied because a command structure itself was not 
copyrightable. Similar cases have been ongoing until to-
day, for example, a recent Supreme Court decision 
found that Google did not violate copyright by using 
code from Java APIs in Android which was seen as fair 
use [52].  
4.3. Reuse with Extensions and Enhancements 
Extensions represent another form of reuse. Extensions 
go beyond enhancements because they are distinct add-
ons to underlying work and not just an enhanced form 
of the work. Extensions include modding an existing 
game by adding characters, weapons, or new scenarios 
and creating a function library for software. Creating 
extensions such as mods may violate copyright if they 
are shared. However, not all game owners seek to limit 
modding, because it creates value for gamers and can 
potentially contribute to the popularity of the original 
game [32]. A further example of extensions is gold 
farming in the video gaming industry, a phenomenon 
that describes when companies use cheap labor force to 
unlock characters, weapons, or other content in online 
games to resell them to players in an unofficial market-
place. Gold farming was particularly prevalent in Bliz-
zard’s massive multiplayer online games World of 
Warcraft. Blizzard fought gold farming and was suc-
cessful in lawsuits because users in online games were 
seen as licensees of the game rather than owners. Bliz-
zard was thus entitled to prohibit gold farming through 
its terms of use [53]. However, it is difficult for game 
developers to quell gold farming completely as users 
find ways to avoid detection, for example by trading 
characters via the dark web [54]. 
4.4. Recombination and Repurposing 
Recombination and repurposing refer to form of reuse 
such as collages, playlists, and other forms of combina-
tion that create a new work of art. Such artwork can be 
created without digital technologies, such as collages 
created from magazines. For example, Salvador Dalí 
used illustrations of a lion from, most likely, a chil-
dren’s book for his work The Accommodations of De-
sire. Such recombination and repurposing lead to copy-
right issues as illustrated by the 2019 movie Yesterday 
that uses numerous songs by the Beatles. The release of 
the movie had to be moved up before the copyright of 
some songs would revert from Sony Music to Paul 
McCartney as a result of a settlement of an earlier law-
suit [55]. Similarly, the successful musical Crazy for 
You, a Broadway production from 1992 largely built on 
songs and lyrics from the Gershwin 1930 musical Girl 
Crazy. Digital technologies have made recombination 
and repurposing significantly easier and have also cre-
ated new art forms. Collages, mashups, and sampling 
has become more widespread as the required material is 
available in abundance online [30]. New formats in-
clude playlists that are a combination of songs in a 
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certain order and can be seen as new work in itself [31]. 
4.5. Digital Transformation Including Reper-
formance 
Lastly, digital transformation refers to a form of reuse 
that is both more automated and more transformative 
than simple enhancements. For example, the reperfor-
mance of old music performances by robots and AI are 
considered a digital transformation type of reuse [56]. 
Yamaha created a “Dear Glenn AI” that would reper-
form the famous Bach and Mozart performances of Ca-
nadian Pianist Glenn Gould, imitating his stylistic nu-
ances [57]. Google Tone Transfer uses machine learn-
ing to transform any audio into one of four instruments 
[58]. This is also possible for voice, as a recent project 
by the company Supertone showed: their voice AI sys-
tem created a new song performed with the artificially 
created voice of folk-rock singer Kim Kwang-Seok, 
who has died almost 25 years ago [59]. Applying these 
technologies to speech allows to create deep fakes, that 
is, artificially created speech that sounds exactly like a 
specific person [60]. Combining all of the above leads 
to a plethora of possibilities to create new material that 
is based on older performances, and imitates nuances of 
instrument performances and even voice both in signing 
and speech. This creates new copyright issues, given 
that material is not directly copied but rather trans-
formed.  
In movies, colorizing was the first step towards 
transformation. While initially, colorizing was largely 
done manually, the increasing capabilities of video ed-
iting technologies enabled automated colorizing and 
even animation. For example, when filming the movie 
Avatar, motion-capture was used to transform actor’s 
physical performances into their digital counterparts. 
Small, body-mounted cameras even capture the facial 
expression and eye movements of actors [61]. Building 
on these technologies, reperformances of existing work 
can be fully automated in the future. Instead of reper-
forming a play with new actors—such as Shaw’s Pyg-
malion that was adapted as the Broadway Musical and 
then the Hollywood movie My Fair Lady—computer 
animation could be applied to create digital reperfor-
mances of movies or recorded plays. Many studios al-
ready preserve 3D digital counterparts of actors which 
can be potentially reused in later movies when the actor 
needs to appear younger or has died [62]. See figure 1 
with an example of the “before image” (on the right) 
and the “transformed image” (on the left), which illus-
trates the capability of digital transformation[63]. This 
new form of transformation goes well beyond the “col-
orizing” of old black-and-white movies, and creates 
new artistic possibilities.  
4.6. Summary of Guiding Principles  
The following principles guide our policy on reuse of 
materials that are themselves based upon reuse of exist-
ing materials: 
• If the work being reused is an authorized reuse of 
protected material and if the original reuse is itself 
protected by its own copyright, then the secondary 
reuse is treated as any other reuse of protected ma-
terial. 
• If the work being reused is of protected material 
and the original reuse has not been authorized, 
then the secondary reuse is likewise unauthorized. 
• If the work being reused is an authorized reuse of 
protected material and if the original reuse is not  
protected by its own copyright, then the secondary 
reuse is of the original protected material is gov-
erned by the protection of the original work. 
• Finally, if the reuse involves unmodified reposting 
of unprotected material, as would be the case if it 
involves images from the digital commons, then 
the reuse cannot be protected by copyright. This 
would appear self-evident but it is in fact contro-
versial. The business model of Getty Images and 
Alamy do involve taking unprotected materials, 
providing indexing, copyrighting their purloined 
images, and charging for the use of images in the 
public domain. In a case that went to trial they ac-
tually attempted to charge a photographer for use 
of her own works, which she had donated to the 
library of congress and they which Getty and 
Alamy had then copyrighted [64]. 
5. Examination of Relationship between 
Change in Transformation Capability 
and the Design of Applicable Copy-
right Regulation  
Because of space limitations, we address only one of the 
six rows in table 1. We address changes in copyright law 
to address the new capabilities of digital transformation 
because this is the newest capability, the most techni-
cally advanced, and the one with the potential of adding 
the most value. For these reasons, it is also the capabil-
ity that requires the most comprehensive reexamination 
of copyright regulation. 
In our analysis of digital transformation, we exam-
ine a spectrum of cases, within the single category of 
reperformance. Once again, our basic argument has 
been that if modern technology makes any form of reuse 
both less expensive and more valuable, then regulations 
affecting and restricting it of necessity need to be re-
laxed and made more flexible and less restrictive. And 
once again, if society had developed a set of regulations 
of any activity, and if those regulations were once opti-
mal, then when the activity has become easier and more 
valuable it is clear that the prior set of regulations re-
stricting that activity can no longer be optimal.  
Consider first the example of robotic 
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reperformance, where technology reverse engineers the 
precise sequence of finger movements, timing, intensity, 
and duration, of every note played in an old Edison-era 
recording of piano music. To be specific, imagine we 
have a very old wax-based recording of Scott Joplin per-
forming his own music. The recording will be mono-
phonic and not stereophonic, of course. It will have cap-
tured a very limited range of frequencies, with none of 
the high-frequency transients that make percussion in-
struments “pop” and sound alive.  Remastering would 
remove surface noise, but would do nothing to restore 
the actual sound of the piano. Having someone else rec-
ord the piece is a real possibility, and indeed Joshua 
Rivkin’s recordings of Scott Joplin were considered the 
standard for some time. But having software analyze the 
recording to reconstruct Joplin’s original finger move-
ments, and then having a robot implement them, strik-
ing the keys of a modern piano in a modern recording 
studio, is fundamentally different from remastering. In 
a very real sense, the reperformance brings Joplin’s re-
cordings of his own music back to life. 
Since robotic performance was never possible be-
fore, there are no provisions in current copyright law 
that would cover the example of robotically reperform-
ing Joplin. And, as we know, individual recordings of 
performances are protected by copyright, just as the un-
derlying composition is protected. We would argue that 
this form of reperformance creates significant value, 
and should be not only permitted but encouraged. 
Clearly society, in its role as an audience, would benefit. 
The owners of the actual copyright in the original per-
formance would suffer only minimal harm, since those 
recordings are of low quality and may have only histor-
ical value; it is unlikely that these new recordings would 
reduce their sales in any way, as their sales are likely to 
be minimal already. Therefore, even modest compensa-
tion to the original copyright owners would be appro-
priate. 
Implicit in our belief that this should be permitted 
is our belief that this reperformance has artistic merit. 
The question of whether the reperformance should be 
granted copyright protection requires assessing its orig-
inality. Once software and hardware necessary to ac-
complish this form of reperformance are generally 
available and inexpensive this form of reperformance 
may appear routine and not worthy of copyright. How-
ever, without a doubt the technology needed to create 
the reperformance is original and should be protected.  
We may want to provide limited copyright protec-
tion to an individual reperformance, much as we would 
provide copyright protection to a recording produced by 
a pianist, a cellist, or an orchestra. But just as any artist 
can record a work, any reperformance artist with access 
to technology can produce a reperformance for com-
mercial use, even if others have already done so. 
Now consider robotic reperformance where the 
analysis may be more complex. Glenn Gould was an id-
iosyncratic pianist with a distinctive sound. He did not 
live long enough to record the entire repertoire for solo 
piano. Suppose someone wanted to robotically reper-
form a recording so that it sounded as if it had been 
played by Gould. This is more complex; assume that the 
reusing artist has had little training as a pianist, and thus 
his unmodified performance would initially be without 
merit, but if he could robotically reperform it to sound 
as if Gould had performed it, the work would  now have 
significant merit. Gould is deceased, and no longer re-
cording, so the reuse does not deprive him of future op-
portunities to record the work. 
If Gould’s estate, or the owners of his body of 
works, believes that the reused performance does not 
harm Gould’s reputation, there should be no obstacle to 
negotiating a licensing agreement that allows this form 
of reperformance to be recorded and used commercially. 
Regulations should be drafted to enable this reperfor-
mance to go forward, and to provide guidance to our 
licensing negotiations. Our discussions about artistic 
merit, originality, and copyright are much as they were 
in the previous example. 
Now consider yet another example, technologically 
simpler but perhaps legally even more complex. Tech-
nology already exists to take one recording of a brass 
instrument and transform it to sound like another. Any 
competent trumpet player who is also a competent audio 
engineer can record “Flight of the Bumblebee” on a 
trumpet and then reperform it on a tuba. Actually play-
ing Flight of the Bumblebee on a tuba is a physical im-
possibility, since no brass player could manage the tri-
ple-tonguing and the super-fast sequence of notes and 
no human tuba player would have enough breath to do 
so. Tuba players might feel threatened by the ease with 
which a trumpet player could create recordings, but 
would have no reason to object other than that. 
However, a competent trumpet player might make 
a recording of a recently released piece of jazz music 
and then copy the embouchure, or “mouth” of an exist-
ing artist like John Faddis. If done poorly, this recording 
would capture the sound of Faddis but not his technique, 
and could potentially damage his reputation; it would 
sound like Faddis, but it would also sound as if Faddis 
had become sloppy or lazy in pursuit of additional rec-
ord sales. If done superbly, by an artist who could match 
Faddis’s fingering and interpretation, this recording 
would actually sound as if Faddis had done it. Let us 
assume that this was done well enough that fans might 
want to acquire this new ersatz-Faddis recording, poten-
tially precluding Faddis from recording the work him-
self. 
There is clearly value to society in its role of the 
audience, since the total collection of works recorded by 
Faddis and his Doppelganger is larger than Faddis’s 
body of works alone. And yet, there is the potential of 
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some harm to Faddis as a result of reduced recording 
opportunities. We believe that this form of reperfor-
mance should clearly be encouraged, since it adds value 
to society. We also believe that revenue sharing among 
the two artists — the actual horn player, for his perfor-
mance, and Faddis for providing his embouchure and 
his waveform — is a complex problem and we have not 
yet fully resolved how it is to be accomplished. And 
again, our discussions about artistic merit, originality, 
and copyright are much as they were in the previous ex-
ample. 
Analogous issues are raised by the ability to trans-
form an image, as was done in the recording of the 
movie Avatar. For example, it is now possible to trans-
form a movie, altering the appearance, race, even spe-
cies of characters and the appearance of their location. 
This allows the creation of entirely new works from ex-
isting videos. Again, issues of artistic merit and origi-
nality are central, and again issues of harm to the owners 
of the original work and the formulas for revenue shar-
ing are complex and unresolved. 
This list of forms of reuse is meant to highlight the 
diversity of forms of transformation. It is not intended 
to be exhaustive either of all forms of transformation or 
all instances of reperformance of existing works. 
6. Conclusions  
6.1. Contributions 
First and foremost, we seek to reintroduce the centrality 
of artistic merit into copyright law. From the mid-19th 
Century, legal doctrine regarding copyright law began 
to focus increasingly on the originality of the work, ra-
ther than on the more subjective question of its artistic 
merit. If work was seen as original, its creator deserved 
the protection offered by copyright, and if this work was 
seen as without merit by the general public the creator 
would gain little or nothing from the granting of copy-
right. 
With the advent of numerous forms of digital trans-
formation, and with the advent of technology that makes 
this capability available to anyone who can master a 
simple user interface, the role of artistic merit has be-
come more critical. An individual should always be per-
mitted the right to create an original work, and its merit 
will determine the value of its copyright. It is a step too 
far to say an individual should always be allowed to re-
use someone else’s original work as the basis of his own, 
especially if the other party’s work is protected by cop-
yright. We therefore propose that artistic merit is now 
central to the decision of whether or not to permit the 
reuse of protected works of art in the creation of works 
that rely on the reuse of those works. 
Reuse of existing works that are already protected 
by copyright should be permitted under the following 
conditions: The reuse clearly adds value; that is, it has 
merit as a work of art. The reuse thus creates a new work 
of art. Reuse should be protected by granting it its own 
copyright only if it demonstrates originality. The deci-
sion to protect a work that is based upon the reuse of 
other works is separate from the decision of whether or 
not to permit that reuse. And works that entail reuse of 
protected works should be required to provide compen-
sation to the owners of copyright that exists in the works 
upon which it is based. 
6.2. Limitations of the Work and Directions for 
Future Research 
The greatest single limitation of this work is our failure 
to resolve questions about how revenue should be di-
vided between the creator of the technology-enabled 
work based upon reuse and the owners of copyright that 
exists in the protected prior works on which it is based. 
We understand that in many cases the owners of copy-
right in the prior works will suffer some damage. When 
the damage to prior copyright holders exceeds the value 
created by the work that reuses it clearly the reuse 
should not be permitted. This would be the case when 
the reuse in some sense significantly damages the value 
of prior copyright holders, decreasing the value of much 
of their existing body of work. When the damage to 
prior copyright holders is small some form of equitable 
division of revenue between the creator of the new work 
that reuses it and the creators of the original works upon 
which the new is based. 
Additional work, too lengthy to present here, de-
scribes how revenues should be shared between the 
original creator and the re-user in order to achieve soci-
etal objectives governing the division of economic sur-
plus between the original creator and the reusing party. 
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Type of Reuse Description of Reuse and Partial List of Examples 
(1) Simple Reproduction or Re-
transmission, Without Quality 
Changes 
Making copies of a book, musical recording, or a photograph; posting 
and streaming or broadcasting a book, photograph, recording, or video. 
File sharing and streaming 
(2) Reproduction with Higher Qual-
ity 
Improving the functionality of software under copyright. Improving 
the user interface of existing software or of an existing game. Adapting 
a play to a new version or to a musical, adapting a play or a musical to 
a movie. 
(3) Reproduction with Enhance-
ments and extensions 
Improving the functionality of software under copyright.  Modding an 
existing game to improve image quality, adapting a play to a new ver-
sion or to a musical, adapting a play or a musical to a movie, taking 
single-user versions of software for word processing and spreadsheets, 
and adapting for multi-user updates. 
(4) Extensions 
Modding an existing game and adding characters or weapons or new 
scenarios. Creating a function library for software that is still under 
copyright protection. 
(5) Recombination and Repurpos-
ing 
Collages, playlists, and other forms of combination to create a new 
work of art, including movies like Yesterday built around a list of 
songs 
(6) Digital Transformation (both 
more automated and more trans-
formative than simple enhance-
ments) 
Robotically reperforming an old recording, colorizing a movie, digi-
tally transforming characters and background as was done in Avatar  
Table 1.—Summary of Forms of Reuse and Transformation 
 
Figure 1.—Digital Image Transformation in the Production of the Movie Avatar. 
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